Annual Survey of Virginia Law: An Overview of Automobile Liability Insurance in Virginia by Wagner, Eileen N. et al.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 3
1994
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: An Overview of
Automobile Liability Insurance in Virginia
Eileen N. Wagner
Jason W. Konvicka
Deborah M.B. McConnell
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eileen N. Wagner, Jason W. Konvicka & Deborah M. McConnell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: An Overview of Automobile Liability
Insurance in Virginia, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 863 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss4/3
AN OVERVIEW OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
IN VIRGINIA'
Eileen N. Wagner*
Jason W. Konvicka**
Deborah M.B. McConnell***
I. INTRODUCTION
Automobile liability insurance coverage is considered one of
the basic necessities of modern living, following closely on the
heels of shelter and food. This priority is the outgrowth of two
facts of life: one, that automobile transportation is practically
unavoidable and two, that automobile accidents are practically
inevitable. Thus, the shadow of liability for the damage and the
suffering of automobile accidents falls across most of the Ameri-
can population. Because the losses which may be sustained by
the negligent-and the innocent alike-are so great, the need
for protection has escalated to the top of modern society's list of
indispensable commodities. Shifting the burdens of such poten-
tial losses to prevent individuals, both innocent and negligent,
1. Portions of this article were originally prepared as an update for the well-
known lawyer's deskbook, Virginia Automobile Liability Insurance (1983) by the late
Wilfred J. Ritz. Accordingly, some parts of this article were taken from the original
Ritz deskbook, and the materials set out below are reproduced with permission of the
copyright owner, The Harrison Company, Norcross, Georgia. Special thanks to Henry
H. Blake and George Mattox for facilitating this limited revival of Ritz's important
work. Thanks also to Peter Swisher, Professor of Law at the University of Richmond.
* Eileen N. Wagner, P.C.; B.S., 1969, Virginia Commonwealth University; M.Ed.,
1970, Ed.D., 1975, University of Virginia; J.D., 1991, The T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond; member of the Richmond law firm, Carpenter Wood-
ward & Wagner, P.L.C.; editor of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association journal,
Lex Claudia.
** Law Clerk for the Honorable Richard S. Bray, Judge, Court of Appeals of
Virginia. B.S., 1991, University of Richmond; J.D., 1994, The T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
*** B.A., 1989, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Candidate,
1995, J.D., The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
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from being financially destroyed, moreover, serves the public
interest.
When we speak of the liability which automobile use impos-
es, we are concerned not only with the losses sustained at the
accident scene, but also with losses which may be sustained
long afterward in court. Following an accident, the blame usual-
ly falls upon the operator of a vehicle involved. As Professor
Calvin H. Brainard wrote, "[tihe peril with which we are pres-
ently concerned is not the automobile accident itself but the
claims and lawsuits that may result from it."2
The automobile liability insurance policy has evolved as a
contractual solution to ease the fear of such losses. In the legal
arena, the insurer agrees to stand in the shoes of the insured,
so to speak, and to protect the insured from the prospect of
ruinous financial losses. Though the concept seems simple
enough, in practice it is quite complex. Because the automobile
is movable, and because many persons may operate it, the
contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured
may become complicated.
A. Four Critical Elements
There are four elements that complicate the terms of the
typical motor vehicle insurance agreement. First, there is the
automobile itself. In an accident analysis for insurance purpos-
es, we need to know facts such as whether the automobile was
owned or borrowed and whether it was a private passenger
vehicle or a truck.
Second, there is the person who bears the blame. In our
analysis, we need to know whether the person to blame was
the owner of the insured vehicle, a relative, employee, or some
other person with permission to drive the vehicle.
Third, there is the claimant. We may need to know how the
injured claimant is related to the person against whom the
claim is being made.
2. CALVIN H. BRAINARD, AuToMOBILE INSURANCE 145 (1961) [hereinafter
BRAINARD].
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Fourth, there is the question of how the vehicle was being
used. We need to know if the insured vehicle was being used
for normal transportation, for business, or for other purposes.3
Because of the wide range of combinations possible from
these four critical elements of the automobile liability insurance
contract, the insurance industry has developed specialized poli-
cies to limit the combinations. The Family Automobile Policy
(FAP), the most common form of insurance contract covering
those vehicles not ordinarily used for business purposes, will be
the subject of this article's discussion.
The Virginia State Corporation Commission (SCC) has creat-
ed approved forms for insurance policies written in the Com-
monwealth. The SCC forms covering family automobile policies
define the "owned automobile" as a private passenger, farm or
utility automobile, including a trailer.4 They define the "per-
sons insured" to be the named insured, any resident of the
same household, any person using the vehicle with permission,
and any other person or organization legally responsible for use
of the automobile.'
B. Coverages
Even with limitations on what sort of vehicle may be insured
under the FAP, a variety of coverages offered by the insurer to
the purchaser of the policy contribute to the complexity of the
contract. For example, Virginia requires that every insurance
policy providing liability coverage also contain uninsured motor-
ist coverage.'
In 1983, Virginia expanded that requirement to include un-
derinsured motorist coverage. The insurer may offer medical
expense and income loss coverage at the option of the policy's
purchaser. Collision coverage insures against losses to the vehi-
cle from collision or upset. Comprehensive coverage insures
3. Id. at 145-46.
4. Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination Policies: Family Automobile
Form, Part I, "Definitions" (Va. State Corp. Comm'n Bureau of Ins., 1st Rev., 1958)
[hereinafter SCC Forms].
5. SCC Forms, Part I, "Persons Insured."
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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against losses from fire, theft and flood. Insurers offer addition-
al coverage against loss of life, against total disability, and
against towing expenses.
As the late Wilfred J. Ritz pointed out, these "different
coverages in a single policy fit together, after a fashion, but
with considerable duplication .... " By way of illustration,
Ritz gave the example of an accident caused by an uninsured
motorist. The blameless owner of the insured automobile may
collect under both his uninsured motorist coverage and under
his collision coverage. Which coverage the insured motorist
chooses to recover under may depend on his deductible, but in
no case will he be able to make a double recovery, thus profit-
ing from his insurance.8
C. Overlapping Coverages and Multiple Policies
Even more interesting is the question of whether a double
recovery may be possible when more than one insurance policy
is available to claims. An example would be a situation where
the negligent driver of an automobile is not the owner of the
insured vehicle, but owns a policy on another vehicle. Osten-
sibly, the injured person has two policies against which to make
a claim. When the claim falls within the limits of both policies,
the question essentially becomes which of the two insurers
must pay the claim. When the damage cannot be covered by
one policy and more than one is available, which policy pays to
the limit and which policy takes the overage? This controversy
is related to insurance "stacking" and has been the source of
much discussion and litigation in recent years.
D. Regulation
Family automobile insurance policies issued by different in-
surance underwriters vary slightly. As stated, the SCC issues
7. WILFRED J. RITZ, VIRGINIA AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 1 (1983) [herein-
after RITZ].
8. See id. at 1-2.
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approved forms that insurance companies writing policies in
Virginia may follow to ensure SCC approval?
The Commonwealth of Virginia regulates the insurance in-
dustry through a collection of statutes in the Code of Virginia
and through the regulatory arm of the SCC. In 1989, the Code
title governing insurance was modified, expanded, and recodi-
fled under the new Title 38.2. Statutes dealing with automobile
insurance were renumbered under two separate titles, Title 38.2
and Title 46.2.
The 1989 revision of the insurance title produced a statutory
description of motor vehicle insurance significantly improved
over the previous statute which had included "aircraft or any
private pleasure vessel, ship, or other watercraft.""° Aircraft
and marine craft have now been culled out of the motor vehicle
insurance statute into separate statutes." The complete text of
section 38.2-124 reads:
A. "Motor vehicle insurance" means insurance against:
1. Loss of or damage to motor vehicles, including trailers,
semitrailers or other attachments designed for use in con-
nection with motor vehicles, resulting from any cause, and
against legal liability of the insured for loss or damage to
the property of another resulting from the ownership, main-
tenance or use of motor vehicles and against loss, damage
or expense incident to a claim of such liability; or
2. Legal liability of the insured, and liability arising
under subsection A of § 38.2-2206 and against loss, damage,
or expense incident to a claim of such liability, arising out
of the death or injury of any person resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of motor vehicles. Motor
vehicle insurance does not include any class of insurance
specified in § 38.2-119.
B. Any policy of "motor vehicle insurance" covering legal
liability of the insured under subdivision 2 of subsection A
and covering liability arising under subsection A of § 38.2-
2206 may include appropriate provisions obligating the
9. See generally SCC Forms, supra note 4.
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-125 (aircraft), 38.2-126 (marine) (Repl. Vol. 1990). The
old statute which lumped together aircraft, pleasure watercraft, and motor vehicles
still survives in Code § 38.2-2204, which governs standard insurance policy provisions
and the omnibus clause.
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insurer to pay medical expense and loss of income benefits
arising out of the death or injury of any person, as set forth
in subsection A of § 38.2-2201. Any such policy of motor
vehicle insurance may include appropriate provisions obli-
gating the insurer to pay weekly indemnity or other specific
benefits to persons who are injured and specific death bene-
fits to dependents, beneficiaries or personal representatives
of persons who are killed, if the injury or death is caused
by accident and sustained while in or upon, entering or
alighting from, or through being struck by a motor vehicle
while not occupying a motor vehicle. These provisions shall
obligate the insurer to make payment regardless of any
legal liability of the insured or any other person.12
E. Outline of this Article
This article will begin by examining the motor vehicle insur-
ance policy as a contract. The formation, execution, perfor-
mance, recision, cancellation, and renewal of the contract will
be discussed in terms of the statutory scheme designed to gov-
ern all insurance contracts in Virginia. Next, the interlocking
complexities of the four critical elements: vehicle insured,
named insured, claimants, and uses will be examined. This
article will then focus on the various forms of coverage offered
by an automobile insurance policy. Finally, this article will
examine the Virginia Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist
Statute and will conclude with a brief discussion of "stacking"
such coverages.
II. FORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
The purpose of the automobile liability insurance contract is
to provide protection against claims for damages and expenses
of litigation. In return for adequate consideration in the form of
a premium, the insurance carrier promises to indemnify the
insured against any legal liability for damages resulting from
an automobile accident. Additionally, the insurance company
promises to defend any suit alleging bodily injury or property
damage, even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false,
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-124 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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or fraudulent. Such promises to pay damages and defend suits
reach deeply into the realm of unforeseeability. Public interest
requires that such promises not be undertaken lightly and that
performance should be certain. To ensure certainty of perfor-
mance, the writing of insurance contracts is strictly regulated
in all jurisdictions. In Virginia, statutory law under Title 38.2
regulates the formation of this contract between the insurance
applicant and the insurance carrier.
A. Requisites to the Contract
Section 38.2-301 states that "[a]ny individual of lawful age
may procure or effect an insurance contract upon himself for
the benefit of any person."13 The same statute, however, for-
bids the knowing procurement of an insurance contract on "an-
other individual unless the benefits under the contract" are
payable either to the insured person or to a person having "an
insurable interest... at the time when the contract was
made." 4 Insurable interests include those "engendered by love
and affection" between persons closely related, "a lawful and
substantial economic interest in the life, health and bodily safe-
ty" of persons not closely related, and in the case of employees,
those who are "key employees" or employees of duration longer
than a year. 5
Likewise, under section 38.2-303, to make a valid contract for
insurance on property there must exist an insurable inter-
est-that is, "any lawful and substantial economic interest in
the safety or preservation of the subject of insurance free from
loss, destruction or pecuniary damage." 6
Section 38.2-304 allows a contract to be formed temporari-
ly-but not longer than sixty days-by means of an oral or
written binder until the insurance carrier is able to issue a
complete, formal policy.' An insurance binder may be a very
brief agreement and its purpose is to allow a person seeking to
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
14. Id.
15. See id. § 38.2-301(B).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-303 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
17. Id. § 38.2-304.
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insure an interest to have the convenience of immediate cover-
age and to avoid the risk attendant to a delay in processing a
formal insurance contract. Virginia law requires the assump-
tion, unless otherwise indicated, that both oral and written
binders include all the usual "provisions, stipulations and agree-
ments which are commonly used in the Commonwealth in ef-
fecting the class of insurance being written." 8
Virginia Code section 38.2-305 provides that any insurance
policy, including an automobile policy, must include:
(1) the names of the parties;
(2) the subject of insurance;
(3) the risks insured against;
(4) the effective date and period during which insurance con-
tinues;
(5) the amount of the premium; and
(6) the conditions pertaining to the insurance. 9
Virginia Code section 46.2-472 sets out the minimum require-
ments for motor vehicle owner's policies used to satisfy the
Commonwealth's statutory requirement of proof of financial
responsibility." First, the vehicles to be covered must be ex-
pressly described.2' Second, the policy must cover the named
insured and any other person using or responsible for the use
of the vehicle, with permission of the owner.' Third, the policy
must:
Insure the insured or other person against loss from any
liability imposed by law for damages, including damages for
care and loss of services, because of bodily injury to or
death of any person, and injury to or destruction of proper-
18. First Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Compton, 230 Va. 166, 169, 335 S.E.2d 262,
264 (1985).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-305 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
20. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950); Stillwell v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va.
588, 592, 139 S.E.2d 72, 75-76 (1964). The requirements of Code § 46.2-472 and its
predecessor statute in former Title 46.1 do not apply to motor vehicle policies that
are voluntarily procured. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472(1) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
22. Id. § 46.2-472(2).
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ty caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, use
or operation of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within
the Commonwealth, any other state in the United States, or
Canada, subject to a limit exclusive of interest and costs,
with respect to each motor vehicle, of $25,000 because of
bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident
and, subject to the limit for one person, to a limit of
$50,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident, and to a limit of $20,000 be-
cause of injury to or destruction of property of others in any
one accident.'
1. Oral Contracts
In 1977, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Dickerson v.
Conklin,' held that an oral contract of insurance may be en-
forceable if all the elements set out under section 38.2-305's
predecessor were proven by clear and convincing evidence. In
Yates v. Whitten Valley Rental Corp.,' the Virginia Supreme
Court reenforced its requirement of a clear and convincing
evidence standard for each element before an oral contract of
insurance could be found enforceable.26
2. Consumer Protection Information
Section 38.2-305 requires that each contract or policy for
insurance have a notice which states substantially that:
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472(3) (Repl. Vol. 1994). A similar version of the bare
necessities, but without the limits necessary for proof of financial responsibility under
Virginia Code § 46.2-435, is the statute designed to define the conditions of an
operator's policy for the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Code
§ 46.2-473 reads:
Every driver's policy shall insure the person named therein as insured
against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for damages,
including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury
to or death of any person, and injury to or destruction of property aris-
ing out of the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned by him, within
the territorial limits and subject to the limits of liability set forth with
respect to a motor vehicle owner's policy.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-473 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
24. 218 Va. 59, 65, 235 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1977).
25. 226 Va. 436, 309 S.E.2d 330 (1983).
26. Id. at 438, 309 S.E.2d at 331.
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In the event you need to contact someone about this policy
for any reason please contact your agent. If you have addi-
tional questions you may contact the insurance company
issuing this policy at the following address and telephone
number ....
If you have been unable to contact or obtain satisfaction
from the company or the agent, you may contact the Virgin-
ia Bureau of Insurance .... 27
Section 38.2-310 requires that all fees, charges, premiums
and other consideration charged for insurance or its procure-
ment must be stated in a policy.' An exception is the service
charge for installment payments of insurance premiums, if
these are provided to the insured in writing.'
Section 38.2-320 requires that the insurer must provide the
insured with the forms required for preliminary proof of loss or
damage within fifteen days of a request from the insured. A
delay beyond fifteen days constitutes a "waiver of any condition,
stipulation or provision in the policy requiring preliminary
proof.""
To insure against the use of "fine print" to obscure critical
provisions of an insurance contract, section 38.2-311 requires
that restrictions, conditions, and provisions contained in any
insurance policy or endorsed by any insurance policy must be
printed in type at least as large as eight points, or written in
ink or typewritten on the policy.3"
3. Other Provisions
Additional provisions may be inserted into insurance policies
or contracts beyond the requirements of section 38.2-305, pro-
vided those provisions are not in substantial conflict with Vir-
ginia law. 2 Such additional provisions may include those re-
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-305(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
28. Id. § 38.2-310(B).
29. Id. § 38.2-310(A).
30. Id. § 38.2-320.
31. Id. § 38.2-311.
32. Id. § 38.2-306.
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quired by the laws of the insurer's state or country of domicile,
those of the state or country in which the policy is to be deliv-
ered or issued, or provisions "necessary to state the rights and
obligations of the parties to the contract because of the manner
in which the insurer is constituted or operated."'
Section 38.2-318 allows any insurance policy or form having a
provision or condition which does not comply with the provi-
sions under Title 38.2 to be valid under Virginia law, but pro-
vides that such a provision or condition will be construed "in
accordance with the conditions and provisions required by this
title."' If the insurance contract is made in violation of the
law, section 38.2-319 provides that the contract "may be en-
forced against the insurer.
"35
4. Jurisdiction and Time Limitations
To establish unequivocally the jurisdiction of Virginia courts,
section 38.2-312 forbids any insurance contract delivered in
Virginia covering people located or residing in Virginia from
having a provision requiring the contract to be construed ac-
cording to the laws of any other state, except to meet the motor
vehicle financial responsibility laws of that state.3 6 Nor may
such insurance contracts contain any provision limiting the
jurisdiction of Virginia courts in any actions against the insur-
er. 7 If a contract should contain such proscribed provisions,
only those improper clauses will be deemed void, while the rest
of the contract will be considered severable and effective.38
Section 38.2-316 gives authority over insurance contracts to
the SCC. The Commission must have a copy of any con-
tract-including endorsements-issued for insurance in the
Commonwealth.39 To establish a minimum statute of limita-
tions to govern insurance policies, section 38.2-314 renders
invalid any provision which limits the time within which an
33. Id.
34. Id. § 38.2-318(A).
35. Id. § 38.2-319.
36. Id. § 38.2-312(1).
37. Id. § 38.2-312(2).
38. Id. § 38.2-312.
39. Id. § 38.2-316(A).
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action may be brought to less than one year after the loss oc-
curs or the cause of action accrues. 41 Section 38.2-315 prevents
a breach of contract which occurs prior to a loss under the con-
tract from voiding the contract or allowing the insurer to avoid
liability under the contract unless the breach existed at the
time of the loss.
41
B. Construing the Terms of the Insurance Contract
1. Ambiguity Construed Against Insurer
"[W]here the language of an insurance contract is susceptible
of two constructions," wrote the Virginia Supreme Court in
American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
"it is to be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured."42
2. Liberal Construction to Advance Public Policy
The Virginia Supreme Court in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Harlow, held that statutory provisions express a public poli-
cy.' Therefore, statutes should be liberally construed to effect
public policy. In Southside Distributing Co. v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co.,' the court made it clear that any conflict between a
provision in an insurance policy and the Virginia Code sounded
the death knell for that provision.'
Where forms promulgated by the SCC under present Virginia
Code section 38.2-2218 may be in conflict with statutory provi-
sions, the form is void according to two federal decisions.46
40. Id. § 38.2-314.
41. Id. § 38.2-315.
42. 212 Va. 302, 304, 184 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1971); see Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance
Corp. v. Crampton, 822 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Va. 1983). But see Quesenberry v.
Nichols, 208 Va. 667, 159 S.E.2d 636 (1968) (holding that an inartfully drawn sen-
tence does not necessarily mean that it is ambiguous).
43. 191 Va. 64, 69, 59 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1950).
44. 213 Va. 38, 189 S.E.2d 681 (1972).
45. Id. at 41, 189 S.E.2d at 683; see United States v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 409 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D. Va. 1976).
46. United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 409 F. Supp. 986, 992-93
(E.D. Va. 1976); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 209 F. Supp. 784, 787 (W.D. Va.
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3. Application Statements Deemed Representations
Under section 38.2-309, statements made by an applicant for
insurance are deemed to be representations and not warran-
ties.4 Moreover, unless a statement made in an application for
insurance can be shown to be both untrue and material to the
risk when it was assumed, the insurer cannot use that state-
ment to bar recovery.4 The standard of falsity of a statement
made in an insurance application, however, need not rise to the
level of being made "willingly" as false or fraudulent.4 9
The insurer must rescind or cancel the policy as soon as it
learns of a misrepresentation which qualifies for rescission,
because delay may constitute waiver or estoppel. The most
likely scenario for the litigation of an application misrepresenta-
tion is that the insurer will learn of a misrepresentation after
there has been a loss.50 In such a case, the insurer would
probably bring "a declaratory judgment action against all inter-
ested parties and have its right to rescind adjudicated."5'
The insurer has the burden of raising the issue of a material
misrepresentation as an affirmative defense and then of proving
that the misrepresentation was material to the risk.52 If the
insurer would have rejected the risk or charged a higher premi-
um if it had known the truth, the misrepresentation will be
found material.' In Scott v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the court held the insurer was not entitled to
rescind because the insurer did not present evidence that it
would have rejected the risk had it known that the teenage son
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir.- 1963).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-309 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
48. Id.; see Parkerson v. Federal Home Life Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1308, 1314
(E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that the materiality of misrepresentation is a question of
law).
49. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 639 F. Supp. 1246,
1250 (W.D. Va. 1986), later proceedings, 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988), aftd, 870
F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989).
50. RITz, supra note 7, at 104.
51. Id.; see, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 210 Va. 769, 173
S.E.2d 855 (1970).
52. Scott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 Va. 579, 584, 118 S.E.2d 519,
523-24 (1961); see Fidelity Bankers Ins. Corp. v. Wheeler, 203 Va. 434, 438-39 (1962).
53. Scott, 202 Va. at 584, 118 S.E.2d at 523-24.
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was the true owner of the vehicle insured under his father's
name.5
In Buckeye Union Casualty Co. v. Robertson,55 the Virginia
Supreme Court held that a representation concerning ownership
may be an immaterial technicality if the insurer would have
charged the same premium had the policy been issued in the
true owner's name.5 In that case, the assigned-risk policy was
issued in the name of the teenage son, although the vehicle
was titled in the mother's name.' In a concurrence, two justic-
es wrote that the misrepresentation was material to the risk,
but because it was an assigned-risk policy, the insurer had not
met its burden to prove willful misrepresentation to void the
policy.'
In MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lusby,59 the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia found that a
statement that the driver's license had never been suspended
was not a material misrepresentation where the license had
been voluntarily surrendered in a juvenile justice proceeding.' °
Misrepresented matters found to be material in the formation
of automobile liability insurance contracts include whether the
automobile to be insured was actually new,5 ' whether the
identification number of the automobile was the one actually
assigned to the insured automobile,"2 and whether the insured
automobile was actually owned by the insured.' An untrue
answer to a question about prior cancellations has been found
material to the risk.'
54. Id.
55. 206 Va. 863, 147 S.E.2d 94 (1966).
56. Id. at 866-67, 147 S.E.2d at 96-97.
57. Id. at 864-65, 147 S.E.2d at 95.
58. Id. at 870, 147 S.E.2d at 99.
59. 295 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1969).
60. Id. at 667-68.
61. See North River Ins. Co. v. Atkinson, 137 Va. 313, 119 S.E. 46 (1923).
62. See id.
63. See generally Scott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 Va. 579, 118
S.E.2d 519 (1961).
64. See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 Va.
944, 948, 154 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1967).
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4. Parol Evidence
Parol evidence provisions of the type found in most insurance
contracts may not be as strictly applied in litigation as their
wording may suggest. A policy may state "that this policy em-
bodies all agreements existing between himself [the insured]
and the company or any of its agents relating to this insur-
ance."6 However, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Butler, the Virginia Supreme Court held admissible
statements going to the issue of whether a valid and binding
contract was formed at the outset." In Butler, the insurer
claimed that the policy had been obtained using false and mate-
rial representations. 7 The trial court had struck the applica-
tion as extrinsic evidence prohibited by the parol evidence pro-
vision of the contract. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's decision because the application had not been offered for
the purpose of interpreting the terms of the contract, but rather
for the purpose of attacking the very formation of the
contract.0
C. Contract Performance
Section 38.2-321 sets out the requirements for an insurer to
be discharged from claims under any insurance policy in Virgin-
ia.69 When the payments under the policy or contract become
payable and the insurer makes the payments in accordance
with the terms of the policy or contract, the insurer is re-
leased. 0
65. RITZ, supra note 7, at 6.
66. 203 Va. 575, 579, 125 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1962); see Nyonteh v. Peoples Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 42, 44-45 (4th Cir. 1992); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Stephens, 313 F. Supp. 890, 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
67. 203 Va. at 576, 125 S.E.2d at 824.
68. Id. at 579-81, 125 S.E.2d at 825-27.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-321 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
70. Id. § 38.2-321(A).
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1. Cooperation
The insured likewise has two critical obligations under the
insurance contract. The first is to assist and cooperate with the
insurer during the investigation, defense or settlement of a
claim.
71
Section 38.2-2204(C) requires that every motor vehicle policy
containing liability coverage must have a provision or endorse-
ment which obligates the insurer even if the insured does not
cooperate. But the statute contains a caveat: "If the failure or
refusal to cooperate prejudices the insurer in the defense of an
action for damages arising from the operation or use of such in-
sured motor vehicle, then the endorsement or provision shall be
void.""
2. Notice
73
Likewise, as a condition precedent to the contract, the in-
sured has an obligation to notify the insurer of any accident or
claims to be made under the policy. 4
71. The approved FAP form issued by the SCC reads:
5. The insured shall cooperate with the company and, upon the
company's request attend hearings and trials and assist in making set-
tlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of wit-
nesses and in the conduct of any legal proceedings in connection with the
subject matter of this insurance. The insured shall not except at his own
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any
expense other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to oth-
ers as shall be imperative at the time of accident.
SCC Forms, supra note 4, "Conditions."
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(C) (Repl. Vol. 1994); see State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Porter, 221 Va. 592, 598, 272 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1980).
73. Portions of this section were taken with permission from RITz supra note 7,
with minor changes to update the material.
74. See generally Porter, 221 Va. 592, 272 S.E.2d 196. The approved SCC form
sets out the requirement:
3. In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice con-
taining particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably
obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances
thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of available
witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any of
its authorized agents as soon as practicable.
SCC Forms, supra note 4, "Conditions."
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a. Form and Contents of Notice
"Notice must be in writing and must contain particulars
sufficient to:
(1) Identify the insured;
(2) Contain or lead to reasonably obtainable information with
respect to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident;
(3) Names and addresses of the injured; and
(4) Names and addresses of available witnesses."75
b. Who Must Give Notice
Notice must be given by or for the insured. The term "in-
sured," in this instance, must be defined in light of the cover-
age that is involved. In the case of liability coverage, the in-
sured is the party who is likely to be a defendant-tortfeasor
and therefore gives notice as a means of protection.
When the insured-tortfeasor does not give notice to the insur-
er, the injured-party plaintiff may be forced to do so. In State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Porter, the driver of
the "insured" hit-and-run vehicle did not give notice of the acci-
dent to his liability insurer.76 The injured claimant knew the
identity of the vehicle and its driver, but did not give notice
until more than seven months after the accident. The court
held that the notice condition of the insurance contract had
been breached."
c. Who Receives Notice and When
Notice may be given directly to the insurer or to any of its
authorized agents. The contract requires that notice be given
"as soon as practicable," a condition which becomes an issue for
the fact-finder.78 The Virginia Supreme Court ruled, in State
75. Rriz, supra note 7, at 94.
76. 221 Va. 592, 272 S.E.2d 196 (1980).
77. Id. at 599, 272 S.E.2d at 200.
78. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 469, 471-72
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Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Douglas,9 that de-
livery of notice after sixty-five days fits the requirement. But in
Sawyer v. Travelers Insurance Co.," the court ruled that notice
given more than ten months after a fatal accident was not
timely. In National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Taylor,
8 1
the court held that notice given 155 days after the accident was
within the standard because the insured was underage, had
little education and had no advisor to point out that his
mother's insurance policy might cover him while he was driving
his own vehicle and not his mother's.82
Another underage motorist was allowed 117 days to give
adequate notice because he was unaware that he had been
involved in a collision where the car against which he was
racing had actually collided with a third vehicle.' In Hunter v.
Hollingsworth, however, the Virginia Supreme Court found that
notice given in September of a July accident was not "immedi-
ate" within the meaning of the policy.'
d. Other Notice Issues
In 1980, the Virginia Supreme Court found an insurer was
justified in denying coverage because the insured had willfully
violated the provisions of the policy relating to notice of acci-
dent, notice of suit, and the forwarding of lawsuit papers."
The General Assembly amended the Code with what is present-
ly section 38.2-2204(C) to state:
(4th Cir. 1960); see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 120, 372
S.E.2d 383, 385 (1988).
79. 207 Va. 265, 148 S.E.2d 775 (1966).
80. 10 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Va. 1935); see Hunter v. Hollingsworth, 165 Va. 583,
594, 183 S.E.2d 508, 512 (1936).
81. 292 F. Supp. 986 (W.D. Va. 1968).
82. Id. at 991.
83. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 411 F.2d
605 (4th Cir. 1969), affg 293 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Va. 1968).
84. 165 Va. 583, 183 S.E. 508 (1936). But see Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 727
F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Va. 1989) (Hunter principles not followed as dicta).
85. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Porter, 221 Va. 592, 598, 272 S.E.2d 196,
199 (1980). Condition 3 of the SCC approved FAP states: "If claim is made or suit is
brought against the insured, he shall immediately forward to the company every
demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative."
SCC Forms, supra note 4, "Conditions."
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If an insurer has actual notice of a motion for judgment or
complaint having been served on an insured, the mere fail-
ure of the insured to turn the motion or complaint over to
the insurer shall not be a defense to the insurer, nor void
the endorsement or provision, nor in any way relieve the
insurer of its obligations to the insured, provided the in-
sured otherwise cooperates and in no way prejudices the
insurer."
An insurer need not show it has been prejudiced in order to
rely upon a breach of the notice condition. The amendment to
the Code requiring the insurer to show prejudice where a
breach of cooperation clause is involved does not apply to the
notice requirement.'
D. Contract Modification
1. Increasing Premiums
Section 38.2-1905 prohibits an insurer from arbitrarily raising
the premium or changing the number of points under a safe
driver insurance plan as a result of an accident unless the
accident can be shown to have been caused, either wholly or
partially, by one of three individuals: the named insured, a
resident of the named insured's household, or another custom-
ary operator of the vehicle. If the principal operator who caused
the accident was insured under a separate policy, the insurer
cannot alter the premium or the points. If the insurer does
increase the premium or points as a result of an accident, the
named insured must be notified in writing and informed of the
right of appeal to the Commissioner."
An appeal of a premium increase or point change on a safe
driver insurance plan must be filed with the Commissioner
within sixty days of receipt of notice of the increase or change.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(C) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
87. State Farm Cas. Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 120-21, 373 S.E.2d 383, 385-86
(1988); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 223 Va. 317, 323, 288 S.E.2d
469, 473 (1982); Erie Ins. Ey- v. Meeks, 223 Va. 287, 290, 288 S.E.2d 454, 456
(1982); Porter, 221 Va. at 598, 272 S.E.2d at 199.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1905(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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The increase or change remains in effect until the Commission-
er rules that an adjustment is warranted. If the Commissioner
rules an adjustment is warranted, the insurer is required to
promptly refund any premium payment and adjust future bill-
ing to reflect the Commissioner's ruling.89
E. Cancellation and Refusal to Renew
An insurer may not cancel or refuse to renew a motor vehicle
insurance policy unless the provisions of section 38.2-2208 have
been followed. The cancellation or refusal to renew must be
mailed by certified or registered United States mail and the
insurer must retain a duplicate copy of the cancellation no-
tice." The Virginia Supreme Court has held, however, that the
insurer is not required to prove that the insured received the
certified or registered notice. 1 If terms of the policy require
notice to any lienholder, then the insurer must follow the same
procedure for verifying the mailing of the notice to the lienhold-
er, the duplicate copy to be held for at least one year by the
insurer.2
1. Statutory Safeguards Against Cancellation
The grounds and procedure for cancellation of or refusal to
renew a motor vehicle insurance policy are set out in detail
under section 38.2-2212. The intention of the statute is to pro-
vide procedural safeguards to the insured when a policy is
cancelled against his or her wishes. 3 In 1991, the General
Assembly removed the vehicle weight limit of 1500 pounds.
Thus the termination of any insurance policy on a private pas-
89. Id. § 38.2-1905 (B).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2208(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
91. See Ampy v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 200 Va. 396, 401, 105 S.E.2d
839, 844 (1958); Locke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Va. Cir. 304, 310 (Richmond City
1992). But see Gregory v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 214 Va. 134, 136, 198 S.E.2d
616, 618 (1973) (holding that the insurer's burden of proving that notice had been
mailed was not met by the introduction of an unsigned or blank certificate).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2208(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
93. See American Interinsurance Exch. v. Lucy, 222 Va. 530, 533, 281 S.E.2d 895,
896 (1981). But see Atwater v. District of Columbia Dep't of Consumer & Regulatory
Affairs, 566 A.2d 462, 471-73 (D.C. 1989).
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senger, state wagon, or motorcycle that is not used commercial-
ly (car pools excepted) or any four-wheel motor vehicle not used
commercially (farm vehicles excepted) will be governed by the
provisions of section 38.2-2212. 9
2. Proscribed Grounds for Cancellation
An insurer is forbidden to refuse renewal of a motor vehicle
insurance policy "solely" on the grounds of age, sex, residence,
race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry, marital status, law-
ful occupation (including military service), lack of driving expe-
rience, or lack of supporting business or potential for acquiring
supporting business. 5
Section 38.2-2213 repeats the prohibition of discrimination on
the bases enumerated above, but limits that protection to resi-
dents of the Commonwealth. The statute also allows an insurer
to limit the writing of insurance policies to persons engaging in
a particular profession or occupation and to persons who are
members of a particular religious sect.'
In addition, an insurer is forbidden to refuse renewal on the
grounds that the insured had one or more accidents or viola-
tions during the four years immediately preceding the policy's
upcoming anniversary date.9" In addition, the insurer may not
refuse to renew if there were two or fewer accidents within a
three-year period unless the named insured, a resident of the
insured's household, or the customary operator of the vehicle
can be shown to be at fault, wholly or partially.98 Fur-
thermore, the insurer may not refuse renewal based on one or
more claims submitted under the uninsured motorists coverage
of the policy if, attendant to those claims, the uninsured motor-
ist was known or "there is physical evidence of contact."'
A single claim-under the medical coverage due to an accident
for which the named insured bore no fault may not be used as
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2212(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
95. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX1Xa-1).
96. Id. § 38.2-2213.
97. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX1Xm).
98. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX1)(q).
99. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX1Xn).
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grounds for a refusal to renew the insurance contract."° Fi-
nally, the insurer may not refuse renewal based on one or more
claims submitted under comprehensive or towing coverage.' °'
If the insured's occupation has changed in such a way as to
"materially increase the risk," however, the insurer is not pro-
hibited by the provisions of section 38.2-2212 from refusing to
renew the insurance contract. Nor is the insurer barred from
renewing an insurance contract if any claim was false or fraud-
ulent. Furthermore, an insurer is not prohibited from setting
rates based on actuarial data.0 2 However, the motor vehicle's
age (provided the vehicle is licensed) may not be used by an in-
surer as the sole reason to refuse to issue or renew a poli-
2. Approved Grounds for Cancellation
Three reasons for cancellation of a motor vehicle policy are
permitted under Virginia law. First, a policy may be cancelled
if the named insured or the person who customarily operates
the vehicle has had his or her driver's license suspended or
revoked during the policy period, or in the case of renewal,
during the ninety days immediately preceding the last anniver-
sary date.' Second, the policy may be cancelled if the in-
sured fails to pay the premium, or any installment of the pre-
mium.'o Third, any new policy can be cancelled if it has been
in effect less than sixty days and the cancellation notice has
been mailed within that time period."°
100. Id. § 38.2-2212(CXlXo).
101. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX1Xp). However, nothing in this section prohibits an insurer
from modifying or refusing to renew the comprehensive or towing coverages at the
time of renewal of the policy on the basis of one or more claims submitted by an in-
sured under those coverages, provided that the insurer mails or delivers to the in-
sured, at the address shown in the policy, written notice of any such change in
coverages at least forty-eight days prior to renewal. Id.
102. Id. § 38.2-2212(CX2).
103. Id. § 38.2-2215 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
104. Id. § 38.2-2212(DX1).
105. Id. § 38.2-2212(DX2). The Virginia Supreme Court has held that the accep-
tance of late premium payments, in and of itself, does not estop the insurer from
cancelling the policy provided that prompt refunds are made to the insured. See Har-
ris v. Criterion Ins. Co., 222 Va. 496, 502-03, 281 S.E.2d 878, 881-82 (1981); Tyler v.
Security Mut. Cas. Co., 7 Va. Cir. 90, 91 (Richmond City 1981).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2212(FX3) (Repl. Vol. 1994). In Virginia Mut. Ins. Co.
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Section 38.2-2210 requires a statement on the first page of
an application form in boldface print warning:
READ YOUR POLICY. THE POLICY OF INSURANCE
FOR WHICH THIS APPLICATION IS BEING MADE, IF
ISSUED, MAY BE CANCELLED WITHOUT CAUSE AT
THE OPTION OF THE INSURER AT ANY TIME IN THE
FIRST 60 DAYS DURING WHICH IT IS IN EFFECT AND
AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER FOR REASONS STATED IN
THE POLICY. 0 7
4. Procedure for Cancellation or Refusal to Renew
If an insurer does cancel or refuse to renew an insurance
contract, the Code sets out precise requirements for the execu-
tion of the cancellation or refusal to renew. Section 38.2-2212(A)
defines the insurer to be "any insurance company, association,
or exchange licensed to transact motor vehicle insurance in this
Commonwealth. "1 "e "Insurance agent" is not mentioned any-
where in the statute. The logical conclusion, then, is that only
the insurance company, and not the agent, may cancel or refuse
to renew a policy.
The notice must be written in type at least eight points in
size and must give the effective date of the cancellation or
refusal to renew. That date cannot be sooner than forty-five
days after mailing, unless the reason for cancellation is failure
to pay the premium, in which case the effective date cannot be
sooner than fifteen days after mailing."°e Moreover, the insur-
er must advise the insured of the right of appeal, and the Code
sets out the exact wording:
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the Virginia Supreme Court held that the language of the
statute's predecessor, § 38.1-381.5(f)(3), related to the date of cancellation by the in-
surer, not the length of time the policy was in effect. Therefore, a cancellation made
by giving notice fifty-five days after the policy was issued-to be effective beyond the
sixty days-was not covered by the statutory requirements. 218 Va. 807, 809-10, 241
S.E.2d 754, 756 (1978).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2210(A) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
108. Id. § 38.2-2212(A).
109. Id. § 38.2-2212(EX1X2).
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
Within fifteen days of receiving this notice, you or your
attorney may request in writing that the Commissioner of
Insurance review this action to determine whether the in-
surer has complied with Virginia laws in cancelling or non-
renewing your policy. If this insurer has failed to comply
with the cancellation or nonrenewal laws, the Commissioner
may require that your policy be reinstated. However, the
Commissioner is prohibited from making underwriting judg-
ments. If this insurer has complied with the cancellation or
nonrenewal laws, the Commissioner does not have the au-
thority to overturn this action."0
Additionally, the insurer must inform the insured of the
possible availability of other insurance through his agent, an-
other company, or the Virginia Automobile Insurance Plan."'
Finally, the notice must be sent by certified or registered mail,
and the insurer must retain a copy."'
5. Commissioner's Role in Review
Section 38.2-2212 contains a provision which protects the
Commissioner of Insurance and any subordinates from any
liability surrounding matters of motor vehicle insurance cancel-
lation or nonrenewal."' An insured may request the Commis-
sioner to review a cancellation or refusal to renew within fif-
teen days of receiving it."'
While the Commissioner has the matter under review, the
policy will remain in effect unless the basis for cancellation was
failure to pay the premium. But the Commissioner may not
substitute his or her judgment for the underwriter of the insur-
er. If the Commissioner finds that the insurer did not comply
with Virginia law and rules in favor of the insured, reasonable
attorneys' fees may be awarded to the insured."5
110. Id. § 38.2-2212(EX4).
111. Id. § 38.2-2212(EX5).
112. Id. § 38.2-2212(EX6), (I).
113. Id. § 38.2-2212(G).
114. Id. § 38.2-2212(H).
115. Id.
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6. Exemptions to Statutory Requirements
Exemptions from the requirements of section 38.2-2212 in-
clude cases where the insurer or its agent has given the in-
sured a written "manifestation" of its willingness to renew.116
The manifestation must include the name of the proposed in-
surer, the expiration date of the policy, the type of insurance
coverage, and information regarding the estimated renewal
premium."' Also exempt from the requirement of section 38.2-
2212 are cases where the named insured or his "attorney-in-
fact," has given the insurer notice in writing of his desire to
cancel or to forego renewal.1
8
Another situation under which a cancellation may be exempt
from section 38.2-2212 is where a motor vehicle insurance poli-
cy has been in effect less than sixty days when the termination
notice is mailed. However, the same does not apply in the case
of a renewal policy."'
Any insurer which limits the issuance of policies of motor
vehicle liability insurance to one class or group of persons en-
gaged in any one particular profession, trade, occupation, or
business is also exempt from the cancellation and refusal to
renew requirements under section 38.2-2212.12°
7. Cancellation and Renewal by the Insured
The insured, on the other hand, may cancel the policy simply
by notifying the insurer or its agent of the cancellation's effec-
tive date.' 2' If by mutual consent, the insured and the
insurer's agent may cancel a policy verbally and without follow-
ing the procedures set out in the policy.'
116. Id. § 38.2-2212(FX1).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 38.2-2212(FX2).
119. Id. § 38.2-2212(FX3).
120. Id. § 38.2-2212(J).
121. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pederson, 185 Va. 941, 41 S.E.2d 64
(1947).
122. Prillaman v. Century Indem. Co. of Hartford, 138 F.2d 821, 823-24 (4th Cir.
1943), afflg 49 F. Supp. 197 (W.D. Va. 1943). But if payment of premiums is financed
through a third party which gains authority to cancel for default, notice to the third
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When an offer of renewal is made by the insurer, difficulties
may arise as to the efficacy of the insured's response. If the
insured simply provided information to the insurer needed to
prepare a renewal policy, and the insurer accepted premiums at
a later time, courts may find sufficient conduct to validate the
contract."2
F. Other Contract Defenses
1. Waiver
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Atlantic National Insur-
ance Co.," 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found that simply because an insurer has filed the re-
quired forms under the financial responsibility statutes, show-
ing that a vehicle is insured does not alone constitute a waiver
of the insurer's right to rely on defenses."
2. Estoppel
As with waiver, courts have found that the filing of the re-
quired forms under the financial responsibility statutes does
not, as a matter of law, estop the insurer from denying cover-
age. '2 Whether the policies were issued as assigned risks un-
party is not notice to the insured. See American Interinsurance Exch. v. Lucy, 222
Va. 530, 281 S.E.2d 895 (1981).
123. See Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carter, 197
Va. 776, 91 S.E.2d 429 (1956). In this case, the insured procrastinated in providing
information for insurance renewal but in February, he did provide the information
upon the insurer's second request. The insured's policy expired at midnight on March
19, and his car was involved in an accident on March 20. Three days later, the in-
sured sent a messenger to pay the premium and pick up the renewed policy, never
mentioning the accident. Three months later the insurer cancelled the policy, refunded
the unearned premium and claimed the effective date of the policy was the day the
premium was paid. Stating that "[insurer's] offer to make a contract was accepted by
[the insured] in giving the agent the information requested and making payment of
the premium," the court ruled the insurance policy was renewed on the day of the
accident. Id. at 780, 91 S.E.2d at 432. But see Boone v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of
Detroit, 192 Va. 672, 66 S.E.2d 530 (1951).
124. 329 F.2d 769 (1964).
125. Id. at 779.
126. See id. at 779; accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 343 (W.D. Va 1969); Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
204 Va. 783, 133 S.E.2d 277 (1963); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio,
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der the Virginia Automobile Insurance Plan does not alter the
bar to estoppel. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, found in
Employers Commercial Union Insurance Co. of America v. Great
American Insurance Co.," that the filing of the SR-22 form
and a failure to timely withdraw it are factors to which the
court should give weight in determining whether the insurer is
entitled to deny coverage.'
In the same decision, the court found that the insurance com-
pany was estopped from denying coverage since it was shown
that the insurer's agent had failed to give prompt notice to the
insured that his policy was cancelled because the company had
learned of false answers on the insurance application. In Vir-
ginia Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brillhart,"1 the Virginia
Supreme Court also found the insurer was estopped from deny-
ing coverage. 3 ' In that case, the agent knew that the insured
thought the insurance would follow from his old car to a newly
purchased one. Because the agent failed to inform the insured
of the true situation, the insurer was prevented from denying
that the insured's new car was, in fact, covered.''
III. ELEMENTS OF COVERAGE
Standard form provisions of the Family Automobile Policy
approved by the SCC for use in the Commonwealth of Virginia
date from the late 1950's. Although the forms have been
amended and various approved endorsements have been added,
today's FAP is essentially the same as the original. The follow-
ing chapter will analyze the basic elements of coverage under
the approved forms used by motor vehicle insurers in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. If a vehicle and its use does not fit
under the definitions set out by the FAP, it should be insured
by using the Basic Automobile Liability Policy.
204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268 (1963).
127. 214 Va. 410, 200 S.E.2d 560 (1973).
128. Id. at 414-15, 200 S.E.2d at 563-64.
129. 187 Va. 336, 46 S.E.2d 377 (1948).
130. Id. at 349-50, 46 S.E.2d at 383-84.
131. Id. at 349, 46 S.E.2d at 383.
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A. The Automobile
Motor vehicle liability insurance rides both with the insured
automobile and with the person who purchased the insurance.
Under liability coverage, the insurer agrees to pay, up to the
policy's limits, for physical injury or property damage resulting
from the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile,
whether owned by the insured or not (under certain circum-
stances)."2 Under liability coverage, the premium charged by
the insured is based on the number of automobiles owned by
the named insured.'
1. Family Vehicles
The SCC approved form defines the "owned automobile" for a
FAP to be "a private passenger, farm or utility automobile, or
trailer owned by the named insured," and may include "a four
wheel private passenger, station wagon or jeep type automo-
bile." 1
4
2. Farm Vehicles
If the vehicle is a farm automobile, it may be "of the truck
type with a load capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less not
used for business or commercial purposes other than
farming."' Likewise, if the vehicle is considered a utility type
other than a farm vehicle, it must have "a load capacity of
fifteen hundred pounds or less of a pick-up body, sedan delivery
132. As Ritz remarked in 1983:
[Extension of coverage to nonowned vehicles] is not required by
statute but is based solely on the policy provisions. It is possible to have
an operator or a nonowned automobile insurance policy under which no
motor vehicle is insured, but such policies are unusual. In discussing the
insured with reference to a nonowned vehicle, it must be understood that
it is an owner policy on an insured vehicle that is involved and the
question is whether the policy extends coverage to an insured when driv-
ing or occupying a nonowned vehicle.
RITZ, supra note 7, at 47.
133. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 155.
134. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions."
135. Id.
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or panel truck type not used for business or commercial
purposes."
136
3. Trailers
Trailers are covered under the typical FAP. Generally, an
accident involving a trailer will also involve the family vehicle
towing it.
137
4. Vehicle Body-Type and Use
Classifying the automobile type included by the FAP is not
enough to determine whether the FAP is the proper policy
under which to insure the vehicle. How the vehicle is used
must be factored into the equation as well. A family automobile
which is used in the insured's business or occupation for calling
on customers may still be covered under a FAP. 1' Even when
a trailer is attached to the family vehicle to carry items, such
as samples or displays, used for calling on customers, the
trailer would still be covered under the FAP. Moreover, a small
truck could be employed to tow a house trailer under the FAP.
But when a house or utility trailer is "(1) attached to other
than a family car and (2) used for business purposes or deliver-
ies," the use is outside the FAP coverage, even though the vehi-
cle type is one normally covered by a FAP. 3 9
a. Ownership
i. Spouse
Who must own the covered automobile? The approved FAP
form states the persons covered under the liability policy with
136. Id. Because the FAP may cover some farm vehicles does not mean that the
mandatory omnibus coverage required under Code § 38.2-2204 (and its predecessor §
38.1-381) in an automobile policy extends to a farm liability policy, as distinguished
from an automobile liability policy. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 211 Va. 373, 376, 177 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1970).
137. See Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Justice, 203 Va. 972, 977, 128 S.E.2d 286, 290
(1962) (holding that a towed "racing car" is not considered a trailer).
138. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 148.
139. Id.
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respect to the owned automobile are the named insured and
any resident of the same household."4 The FAP defines
"named insured" as the individual named in Item 1 of the dec-
larations and his spouse, if a resident of the same house-
hold."' The liability coverage of a standard FAP, then, effec-
tively provides insurance "on all family-type automobiles owned
by the named insured and spouse at any time during the policy
period."
4 2
ii. To Whom Registered
While the SCC-approved form details what vehicle type may
be covered by the FAP, it leaves "ownership" undefined. Ritz's
discussion of ownership in 1983 is still applicable today:
Generally, the person named in the policy as the named
insured is deemed the owner of the automobile described in
the policy, regardless of the true facts of ownership. Thus
the father is deemed the owner of the vehicle registered in
his name and described in the policy, although the actual
facts might show that a son, perhaps under the age of 25,
is the true owner.14 1
Of course, misrepresentation of ownership justifies nullification
of the entire insurance contract if the insurer can show that
the misrepresentation was material. Ultimately,
"[d]etermination of the ownership question depends upon appli-
cation of Virginia laws relating to registration and licensing of
motor vehicles, particularly the statutes relating to certificates
of title and their transfer."144
140. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Persons Insured."
141. Id. at "Definitions."
142. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 151.
143. Rrrz, supra note 7, at 54.
144. Id. at 55; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-628 to -633 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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iii. Completed Sales
In Wicker v. National Surety Corp., 4 a question of the ap-
plicability of the used car dealer's liability insurance arose after
he sold a purchaser a used car. The court found that the sale
had been executed, and was not executory, and so the dealer's
policy did not cover the vehicle when the purchaser had an
accident. The court wrote:
In Virginia, if the assignment of the title certificate has not
been executed at the time of the accident, the seller has at
least a legal title and the entire transaction may be held to
be executory. At the same time, it is clear that if the seller
delivers the title certificate to the purchaser, the assign-
ment on the back of the certificate having been properly
executed, the seller has divested himself of all interest in
the vehicle whether or not the purchaser thereafter com-
plies with his statutory duty of filing the assigned certifi-
cate with the Division of Motor Vehicles. Under the Virgin-
ia decisions execution of the assignment and delivery of the
certificate are, or may be, critical and conclusive of the
question of passage of title, but filing the documents with
the Division of Motor Vehicles is not. 4 '
The reverse facts yielded the same result. When a dealer had
an accident shortly after purchasing an automobile from its
owner, the dealer's policy, in this case uninsured motorist cov-
erage, was operative, not the seller's.'47 When a West Virginia
car dealer transferred title to a purchaser who had an accident
two days later in Virginia, the court held that because the deal
was complete, the car dealer's insurance did not apply at the
time the vehicle was involved in the accident."
If a nonowner policy expressly excludes any person to whom
possession was transferred by agreement of sale, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that such an exclusion was satisfactory
145. 330 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964).
146. Id. at 1012 (citation and footnote omitted).
147. See generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp.
958 (W.D. Va. 1964).
148. Woodson v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Va. 423, 428, 177 S.E.2d 610, 614-15
(1970) (applying West Virginia law, but finding no precedent for adopting Virginia
principles of insurance law).
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and statutory provisions that would extend coverage did not
apply.1
b. Other Vehicles Covered
The physical body types described in the SCC-approved forms
constitute a bright line between coverage under the FAP and
coverage under the Basic Automobile Liability Policy.'
i. Newly Acquired Replacement
When an insured acquires a replacement for the insured
motor vehicle, the insurance policy automatically transfers to
the new vehicle. 5' However, the owner must actually replace
the previous vehicle. In Butler v. Government Employees Insur-
ance Co.,52 the owner put the older vehicle up for sale and
transferred the license plates to the newer vehicle. The court
found the arrangement was not a "replacement.""
ii. Newly Acquired Additional Automobile
If an insurance company insures all the vehicles owned by a
given insured, then a newly acquired additional automobile is
automatically insured provided that the insured notifies the
carrier during the policy period or within thirty days after ac-
149. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 215 Va. 676,
681, 212 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1975).
150. See generally SCC Forms, supra note 4.
151. Condition 2 under the SCC-approved form for the FAP states:
If the named insured disposes of, acquires ownership of or replaces a pri-
vate passenger, farm or utility automobile or, with respect to Part M
[Physical Damage], a trailer, he shall inform the company during the
policy period of such change. Any premium adjustment necessary shall be
made as of the date of such change in accordance with the manuals in
use by the company. The named insured shall, upon request, furnish
reasonable proof of the number of such automobiles or trailers and a de-
scription thereof.
SCC Forms, supra note 4, "Conditions."
152. 212 Va. 174, 183 S.E.2d 147 (1971).
153. Id. at 176, 183 S.E.2d at 149. Note that when an owner described an older
vehicle as mechanically inoperable and used a newer vehicle exclusively, a federal
district court held that the newer vehicle was a replacement. See Iowa Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 292 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Va. 1968) affd, 408 F.2d 4 (4th Cir.
1969).
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quisition. If, however, the insured owns other vehicles insured
by other companies, the automatic coverage of a newly acquired
vehicle does not apply.'1"
In Celina Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cohen, the court held the
insurer must be notified of the purchase of a new automobile to
effect coverage.'55 The insured obtained title on January 29,
had an accident on February 28, and notified the insurer on
March 16, five days after the policy had expired.'
iii. Temporary Substitute Automobiles
Under the FAP, an owned automobile may also be a tempo-
rary substitute. Such an automobile or trailer, though "not
owned by the named insured," is covered while "temporarily
used as a substitute for the owned automobile or trailer when
withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair,
servicing, loss or destruction."57
A vivid example would be a family car which is disabled by a
dead battery. A neighbor, who happens to be a contractor, of-
fers a five-ton dump truck on loan to run an important errand.
As this is the only vehicle available, the insured takes his
neighbor's offer. While he is driving the dump-truck he is in-
sured under his own FAP.'
If the dump truck belonged to the same person whose family
car battery ceased operating, however, the FAP would not sub-
stitute for liability coverage even if the truck were being used
for a family errand.'59 The rationale behind this would be that
"[t]he named insured cannot be held responsible for the exis-
tence or non-existence of insurance on his neighbor's truck ...
[b]ut if he neglects to provide primary insurance on his own
truck... " he has done so at his own risk."8
154. SCC Forms, supra note 4.
155. 204 Va. 763, 767, 133 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1963).
156. Id.
157. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions;" RITZ, supra note 7, at 59.
158. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 149.
159. See Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jerrell, 236 Va. 261, 267-68, 373
S.E.2d 913, 916-17 (1988); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Manojlovic, 215 Va. 382,
383, 209 S.E.2d 914, 915 (1974) (parties agree vehicle in question is neither owned
nor nonowned within policy definitions).
160. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 149. See Armstrong v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
1994] 895
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:863
iv. Nonowned Automobile
The FAP covers another type of nonowned vehicle as well. A
"nonowned automobile" is either an automobile or a trailer that
is "not owned by the named insured, while temporarily used as
a substitute for the owned automobile or trailer when with-
drawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, ser-
vicing, loss or destruction."'' Because the premium for liabil-
ity coverage is based on the number of vehicles owned by the
named insured, inclusion of nonowned vehicles amounts to free
coverage if those vehicles are driven regularly and frequent-
ly.'62 Therefore, the definition excludes those nonowned vehi-
cles "furnished for the regular use" of the insured."6
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith,"6
the Virginia Supreme Court distinguished "permission" and
"furnished" in this way: "We interpret the language 'furnished
to the named insured for regular use' as referring to the fur-
nishing for the insured's own purposes, and not the furnishing
for the owner's or his family's purposes, with incidental permis-
sion for use by the insured for her purposes."'"
In 1989, however, the supreme court, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jones," overruled the Smith de-
cision to the extent that it implied that a vehicle must be fur-
nished primarily for personal use, regardless of frequency of
use, to qualify as "regular use.""'
215 Va. 333, 335, 209 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1974) (finding father's truck was not a tempo-
rary substitute automobile and therefore not covered under policy purchased for son's
disabled and never-repaired automobile). But see Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1966) (finding sons "unin-
sured" vehicle was a temporary substitute automobile under father's policy when
father's vehicle was disabled and son provided transportation for fellow employees
with whom his father had an arrangement to provide rides).
161. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions."
162. See BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 155.
163. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions." An example would be a car
that an employer provides for its traveling salesperson.
164. 206 Va. 280, 142 S.E.2d 562 (1965).
165. Id. at 288, 142 S.E.2d at 567.
166. 238 Va. 467, 383 S.E.2d 734 (1989).
167. Id. at 470, 383 S.E.2d at 736. In this case, the employer furnished Jones the
van he drove daily and allowed him to use the van for personal purposes if he ob-
tained permission. Jones was injured in an on-the-job accident. His employer's insur-
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In Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"6
the court found the test to be not actual use, but whether the
vehicle was furnished for use.169 In that case, a daughter who
lived with her parents was an insured under her father's insur-
ance policy. However, her spouse had purchased an automobile
and left it at home while on a military tour of duty. The court
held that her spouse's vehicle had been furnished for her regu-
lar use. Since her spouse's vehicle did not qualify as a
nonowned vehicle, her father's liability coverage did not include
her use of her spouse's vehicle.'
In 1968, the Virginia Supreme Court made clear that an
automobile furnished by an employer to transport employees
between home and work, as well as to meet transportation
needs while on the job, would not be considered as furnished
for regular use.'
Problems arise with borderline cases on the frequency of use.
If an employee uses his employer's vehicle once a month, every
month, such use might be classified as "regular." Yet, the fre-
quency is not enough to increase the insurer's exposure to loss
to any significant degree.
v. Exclusions
Even though the owned automobile may be covered by liabili-
ty insurance, under the exclusions section of the FAP the cover-
age may be suspended under certain conditions. Exclusion (a) of
ance was insufficient to cover his damages so he sought coverage under his personal
automobile policy's "nonowned vehicle" provision. That provision defined a nonowned
automobile as one "not owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the
named insured or any relative, other than a temporary substitute." Id. at 468, 383
S.E.2d at 735.
The trial court found that the van was furnished for purposes of Jones' employ-
er, not for his personal use. Thus, the van was not furnished for Jones' regular use.
The court entered summary judgment in Jones' favor. Nevertheless, the court wrote:
"[tihe instant case presents frequent, daily, and extensive use, dominion and control
of the van by Jones. Here, the purpose of furnishing the van to Jones was precisely
that it be used regularly by him." Id. at 470, 383 S.E.2d at 736.
168. 340 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1972).
169. Id. at 229.
170. Id. at 230-31.
171. Quesenberry v. Nichols, 208 Va. 667, 674, 159 S.E.2d 636, 641 (1968); see
Jones, 238 Va. at 470, 383 S.E.2d at 736.
172. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 156.
19941 897
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:863
the SCC Forms states the policy does not apply "to any auto-
mobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, but this ex-
clusion does not apply to the named insured with respect to
bodily injury or property damage which results from the named
insured's occupancy of a nonowned automobile other than as
the operator thereof."" 3
Exclusion (g) states the policy does not apply:
[T]o an owned automobile while used in the automobile
business, but this exclusion does not apply to the named in-
sured, a resident of the same household as the named in-
sured, a partnership in which the named insured or such
resident is a partner, or any partner, agent or employee of
the named insured, such resident or partnership. 4
Exclusion (h) states the policy does not apply:
[Tbo a nonowned automobile while used (1) in the automo-
bile business by the insured or (2) in any other business or
occupation of the insured except a private passenger auto-
mobile operated or occupied by the named insured or by his
private chauffeur or domestic servant, or a trailer used
therewith or with an owned automobile.'75
The import of these exclusions will be discussed in more detail
under the section on "uses" below.
B. Coverage of Persons
Any accident giving rise to the need for liability coverage
must involve both a vehicle and some person as its owner or
driver.17 The following are considered "Persons Insured" un-
der the SCC-approved form:
(a) With respect to the owned automobile,
(1) the named insured and any resident of the
same household,
173. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 158.
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(2) any other person using such automobile, pro-
vided the actual use thereof is with the permis-
sion of the named insured;
(b) With respect to a nonowned automobile,
(1) the named insured,
(2) any relative, but only with respect to a private
passenger automobile or trailer,
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of
the owner;
(c) Any other person or organization legally responsible for
the use of
(1) an owned automobile, or
(2) a nonowned, if such automobile is not owned
or hired by such person or organization,
provided the actual use thereof is by a person who is an
insured under (a) or (b) above with respect to such owned
automobile or nonowned automobile.17
1. Virginia Law and the Omnibus Clause"
The insurance industry has not developed a term to distin-
guish the person who actually takes out an automobile insur-
ance policy from the other people insured under that same poli-
cy. Someone must apply for the insurance, determine the
coverages and policy limits desired, and pay the premiums. This
person will generally be the named insured, but there is no
necessary connection required, either by statute or by policy
terms, between the person who takes out the insurance and the
named insured.
Generally it is to a person's advantage to be an "insured"
under an insurance policy. But this is not an invariable rule,
for being an insured under one coverage or for one purpose may
have the effect of excluding the person from being an insured
under a different coverage or for a different purpose.
Inasmuch as an injured party may be both a victim and a
177. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, 'Persons Insured."
178. This section was taken with the publisher's permission from Rrrz, supra note
7, with only minor changes to up-date the documentation.
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tortfeasor, his position as an insured has different consequenc-
es. Therefore, it is always necessary to make an inquiry as to
whether a particular person is an insured with reference to a
particular coverage and for a particular purpose.
The protections provided by an automobile insurance policy
are not limited to the named insured, that is, to the person
who takes out the policy and presumably pays the premiums.
The coverage extends in two different directions.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry,7 ' the Virginia
Supreme Court described these extensions of coverages in terms
of classes of insureds:
It is our opinion that the legislature, in enacting the unin-
sured motorist statute, intended to create two classes of
insured persons, with different benefits accruing to each
class.
The first class includes the named insured and, while resi-
dent of the same household, the spouse of any such named
insured, and relatives of either. A member of this class is
protected, "while in a motor vehicle or otherwise," and is
conceded ... to be entitled to coverage if injured while a
pedestrian ....
This brings us to a consideration of the second class of
insured persons contemplated by the statute, that is, those
"who use," with the consent, expressed or implied, of the
named insured, the vehicle to which the policy applies and
those who are guests in such vehicle.'
Although the court was speaking of the uninsured motorist
coverage, the distinctions are equally applicable under the lia-
bility policy. The statutory requirement for the broadening of
coverage to include insureds of the second class is popularly re-
ferred to as the omnibus clause which is probably the single
most litigated clause in the policy.
179. 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1966).
180. Id. at 836-37, 134 S.E.2d at 420.
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2. The Named Insured
The named insured under the SCC forms is the individual
named in Item 1 of the declarations. This named insured is
treated as the owner of the vehicles described in the declara-
tion.18
1
3. The Named Insured's Spouse
The same definition which set out the terms for "named
insured" includes that person's spouse, if a resident of the same
household. Husband and wife can be actually named in the
policy, but even if one is not listed, the unlisted spouse never-
theless stands in the shoes of the named insured for the terms
of the policy.'82
This provision means the spouse, though unnamed, can give
permission for use of the automobile, which is effective to make
the permissive user an insured. This provision is also of benefit
to the unnamed spouse when driving a nonowned automobile,
which is not a private passenger car, inasmuch as only a
named insured is covered in such a case.
4. Relatives in the Same Household
Both a relative and nonrelative who is a "resident of the
same household" are insureds under the FAP.'" None of the
key words-resident or household-are defined in the policy and
the definition of "relative" uses its own root in the definition
giving little guidance. A relative resident is an insured whether
that person has permission to operate the motor vehicle or
181. Item 1 also calls for a mailing address, which is considered the place of prin-
cipal garaging of the vehicle insured, unless a different place of garaging is given.
The place of principal garaging determines the state whose law determines the con-
tents of the policy and also who regulates the policy. Thus, a Virginia policy is issued
only on an automobile principally garaged in Virginia at the time the policy was
issued. The place in Virginia where the automobile is principally garaged determines
the amount of premium that will be charged.
182. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions."
183. Id.
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not.' Therefore, a relative resident is apparently insured,
even if forbidden to drive the automobile.
Whether a person is a relative living in the same household
may generate controversy if that person was once a resident
and is no more, or if that person only recently became a resi-
dent of the household."
A relative resident of the same household is as fully covered
as the named insured when liability involves the owned auto-
mobile. But the same cannot be said for the relative resident
when liability involves nonowned automobiles. The relative
resident is an insured only when liability involves a nonowned
private passenger automobile. In the case of the named insured,
there is no restriction on that type of nonowned automobile.'
5. Household Resident Not a Relative
The liability policy covers the household resident who is not
a relative of the insured to the same extent as the relative
resident or the named insured when liability involves an owned
automobile. The requirement of permission does not apply to
the residents of the insured's household, whether relatives or
not. But the coverage does not extend to use of nonowned auto-
mobiles of any description."7
184. See id.
185. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 221 Va. 358, 362, 344 S.E.2d 890, 892
(1986); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Va. 18, 22, 161
S.E.2d 694, 697 (1968) (defining "household" as "a collection of persons as a single
group, with one head, living together, a unit of permanent and domestic character,
under one roof"); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 206 Va. 280, 285,
142 S.E.2d 562, 566 (1965), overruled on other grounds, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Jones, 238 Va. 467, 383 S.E.2d 734 (1989) (requiring the person to have "as-
sumed a residence and become so intertwined with the . . . family as to become a
member of that family"). In Smith, the court ruled that the negligent driver was not
a member of the insured's household when she drove an uninsured vehicle owned by
the insured. Smith, 206 Va. at 285-86, 142 S.E.2d at 566. But the court stopped
short of defining whether the driver was a relative.
186. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions".
187. Id.
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6. Permissive User
A permissive user is a person using an automobile, ordinarily
driving it, with the permission of the named insured. After
combing out all the repetitive qualifiers, Code subsections 38.2-
2204(A) and (C) require all motor vehicle insurance policies to
contain a provision or endorsement, commonly called the omni-
bus clause, insuring "any other person using or responsible for
the use of the motor vehicle . . . with the expressed or implied
consent of the named insured.""
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co., 89 the Virginia Supreme Court
set out the statutory parameters for the permissive user under
the omnibus clause of approved insurance policies:
Virginia Code § 38.2-2204, the omnibus clause, requires
that an automobile liability insurance policy provide cov-
erage for a person who is "using" a motor vehicle "with the
express or implied consent of the named insured." In inter-
preting this provision we have rejected the broad interpreta-
tion held by some states that express permission to use the
vehicle for one purpose implies permission for all other
purposes. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va.
658, 665, 43 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1947). Nevertheless, we have
repeatedly held that the omnibus clause is remedial and
must be liberally interpreted to subserve the clear public
policy reflected in it, which is to broaden the coverage of
automobile liability policies. In defining "implied permis-
sion," and applying it to the facts of the many cases we
have had, this court has been liberal in its interpretation
and application, and has gone far in holding insurance
carriers liable. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Harlow, 191 Va.
64, 68-69, 59 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1950).190
Permission to drive a car presupposes that the person who
gave the permission has the power to give or withhold it. Ordi-
narily, the person giving permission must own the vehicle or
have such an interest in it that he is entitled to possession and
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(A),(C) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
189. 241 Va. 326, 402 S.E.2d 21 (1991).
190. Id. at 330, 402 S.E.2d at 22.
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control. If the named insured sold the vehicle, the buyer's use
is by virtue of the buyer's ownership and not by virtue of any
permission given by the seller. Thus, the seller's insurance
policy would not cover the buyer when the buyer is driving the
car. 191
7. Legal Responsibility
The SOC-approved FAP covers another class of insureds-
persons or organizations "legally responsible for the use of...
an owned automobile, . . . or a nonowned automobile . . . pro-
vided the actual use ... is by a person who is an insured un-
der" one of the definitions of insured.92 The principal effect of
this definitional extension is to eliminate the necessity of
duplicative causes of action where the relationship of the per-
son using the vehicle to the person or organization "legally
responsible" might give rise to liability under respondeat superi-
or or agency doctrines. 9 '
8. Severability of Interests
The SCC-approved form concludes the listing of insureds
under Part I with the following: "The insurance afforded under
Part I applies separately to each insured against whom claim is
made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than
one insured shall not operate to increase the limits of the
company's liability."1" This clause is added to prevent an ex-
191. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cole, 203 Va. 337, 341, 124 S.E.2d 203, 206
(1962).
192. SCC Forms, supra, note 4, at Part I, "Persons Insured."
193. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 162. Brainard noted:
The injured third party would probably join both the named insured and
the person or organization he represented in one action for damages, and
therefore any judgment awarded the injured party would be collectible
from the defendant. Since the insurer has the burden of defending its
named insured in any event, there is little reason why it should not also
include in the defense his principal and codefendant. Thus, the FAP
insures not only the named insured and other persons actually using his
car but also any person or organization legally responsible for its use.
Id. at 163 (emphasis in the original).
194. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Persons Insured."
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tension of coverage as to persons from being improperly inter-
preted as an extension of coverage as to dollar amount. 95
C. Use
1. Permissible Uses
A discussion of the use of the vehicle insured inevitably over-
laps with the description of the types of vehicles insurable un-
der the FAP. Nevertheless, the opportunity for circumstances to
fall through the cracks in a legal analysis of the FAP requires
examining the uses of the vehicle separately. Under the
"definitions" section of Part I of the SCC-approved FAP, "use" of
the vehicle is simply explained as including "the loading and
unloading" of the vehicle."9
Unlike the Basic Automobile Liability Policy, which states the
purposes for which the covered vehicle is used, the FAP does
not address the purpose of use. So unless a specific use is ex-
cluded in the contract, any legal use should be covered. Because
the FAP is specifically designed for "family-type" vehicles which
are owned by individuals, a presumption arises that the pur-
pose of use would be limited to those activities associated with
family living such as "for pleasure, family errands, driving to
195. See RITZ, supra note 7, at 44 ('The fact that potentially there are two or
more insureds, such as a servant and a master, that may be held liable to an injured
claimant does not increase the policy limits.").
196. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions;" see generally American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 605 (4th Cir. 1969),
affg 293 F. Supp. 256, 260 (W.D. Va. 1968) (holding that when a non-participating
vehicle is damaged by a vehicle which was engaged in a race, the passive vehicle
was also being "used" within the meaning of the coverage); Safeguard Ins. Co. v.
Justice, 203 Va. 972, 128 S.E.2d 286 (1962) (holding that towing qualifies as a "use").
A tougher question is whether a vehicle is being used if the insured is struggling
with his keys at the time he is attacked by an assailant. In Lord v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., the court, in order to decide the case on another issue, assumed the
injured insured was using the vehicle at the time. 224 Va. 283, 295 S.E.2d 796
(1982). But where a vehicle was employed as a gun-rest when the insured was in-
jured, one federal court showed a strong desire to draw the line. See Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1960); see also Wausau Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Hoover, 727 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (D.S.C. 1990) (holding that a
shooting attack and resulting injuries did not arise from the use of an automobile,
since the attack was not reasonably identified with normal use of the vehicle).
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and from work, and also, when the insured travels in connec-
tion with his [or her] business."1 97
Not forbidden by the FAP is the circumstance where a family
car is used by an individually owned business for traditionally
commercial purposes such as transporting supplies or making
deliveries. Theoretically, such uses would be factored into the
insurer's calculation of the risk when the policy was creat-
ed.198
2. Exclusions
Not covered at all by the FAP's liability coverage are three
situations worth noting. First, no coverage exists in the FAP for
injury or damage caused intentionally, or by the direction of the
insured.' Second, unless the injured party is a domestic em-
ployee not covered by workers' compensation, employees injured
in the course of their employment would also not be covered
under the FAP's liability coverage.' Finally, injury to proper-
ty in the charge of or being transported by the insured is not
covered.20' These three gaps are not dependent on whether
the vehicle is owned or nonowned at the time of the accident.
a. Exclusion for Intentional Conduct
In 1982, the Virginia Supreme Court essentially gave effect
to the exclusion for intentional conduct in Utica Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.2°2 The court found that an
automobile liability policy provides coverage only for damages
caused by an "occurrence" or by an "accident." The court then
held that "[a]n intentional act is neither an 'occurrence' nor an
'accident' and therefore is not covered by the standard policy."23
197. Id. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions."
198. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 174.
199. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
200. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2205(AX1) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
201. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
202. 223 Va. 145, 286 S.E.2d 225 (1982).
203. Id. at 147, 286 S.E.2d at 226.
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Virginia Code section 38.2-2204 does not address the issue of
coverage based on an accident or an occurrence. However, these
terms are still used in some automobile liability policies.
2°4
b. Employee Bodily Injury
In 1966, the Virginia General Assembly amended the automo-
bile liability insurance statute to make clear that any endorse-
ment, provision, or rider limiting or reducing the coverage re-
quired by the Virginia Code would be wholly void.20 5 In 1972,
the Virginia Supreme Court held that this statute invalidated
the standard employee exclusion found in many standard FAP
forms.2° The statute expressly provides that coverage between
employees cannot be excluded even though one employee is
awarded workers' compensation.0 7 However, the statutory pro-
visions relating to liability and uninsured motorist coverage are
not applicable to policies issued to cover employers' liability
under any workers' compensation law or liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.0 8
c. Public or Livery Conveyance
When a vehicle is used for hauling cargo, the insurer faces
an increased risk called a "trucking risk." Likewise, when a
passenger is charged for a ride in the vehicle, the operator of
the vehicle is characteristically held to a higher standard of
care. In either case, higher mileage is also more likely than
204. See Lerner v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 219 Va. 101, 102, 245 S.E.2d 249, 250
(1978); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Obenshain, 219 Va. 44, 45, 245 S.E.2d 247, 248
(1978); Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 720, 239 S.E.2d 902, 903
(1978).
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(D) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
206. See Southwide Distrib. Co. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 213 Va. 38, 189
S.E.2d 681 (1972). This case specifically states that Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co. v. Kellam,
207 Va. 736, 152 S.E.2d 287 (1967) and Stillwell v. Iowa Natl Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va.
588, 139 S.E.2d 72 (1964), are no longer followed. 213 Va. at 40-41, 189 S.E.2d at
683. Presumably, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 196 S.E.2d 75
(1973), should also be included among the cases no longer followed. The accident
involved in this case occurred in 1965, before the statutory amendment. See also
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Pinkard, 356 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1966), affg 258 F. Supp.
804 (W.D. Va. 1965).
207. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2207 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
208. Id. § 38.2-2206(I).
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under normal family-driving circumstances. The result of this
underwriting analysis is the standard exclusion "of any automo-
bile while used as a public or livery conveyance, but this exclu-
sion does not apply to the named insured with respect to bodily
injury or property damage which results from the named
insured's occupancy of a nonowned automobile other than as
the operator thereof."2"
The Virginia Supreme Court defined a vehicle as being used
for public or livery conveyance "if it is held out to the general
public for carrying of passengers for hire and is used indiscrimi-
nately to carry the public."2 10 In Smith v. Stonewall Casualty
Co., the court held that the use of the vehicle in a car pool
involving payment is not a holding out to the public and so
does not fall within the exclusion.211 This exclusion does not
apply to the named insured sustaining either bodily injury or
property damage while occupying a nonowned automobile other
than as the operator.212
d. Property Owned or Transported by the Insured
The liability coverage under the policy language does not
apply to damage caused to the insured due to injury or destruc-
tion of property owned by and transported by the insured, nor
to property rented to or in his charge, other than a residence or
private garage.21 3 This clause was intended to prevent conver-
sion of the liability policy into a limited collision policy. 4
209. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions." Because the exclusion ap-
plies only while a car is "used as a public or livery conveyance," a vehicle will be
covered by the FAP in an accident occurring while the vehicle was being used for
typical family purposes even though on the preceding weekday the same vehicle had
been used for public purposes. See BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 176.
210. Smith v. Stonewall Cas. Co., 212 Va. 765, 766, 188 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1972).
211. Id.
212. Rrrz, supra note 7, at 74.
213. Id.
214. See generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 208 Va. 28, 155 S.E.2d 358
(1967) (holding that a contractor working on another's land is not "in charge of" the
property, so that damage to it will fall within the property exclusion clause).
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e. Farm Machinery
Exclusion (d) of the SCC-approved form for the FAP provides
that coverage will not apply "to bodily injury or property dam-
age arising out of the operation of farm machinery."21 ' Be-
cause a collision with a farm implement is like an automobile
accident, that event would be covered under the FAP. But an
injury due to operation of that machinery fits into a different
category of accident and requires a different analysis for under-
writing. Such coverage would be best obtained under a Farmers
Comprehensive Personal Liability contract.
216
f. Automobile Business Uses
Under the definitions to Part I of the SCC-approved FAP
form, "automobile business" is defined as "the business or occu-
pation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking auto-
mobiles."217 As stated earlier, the insurer takes on a different
risk when insuring business use rather than family-type use.
For the specific type of business characterized as an automobile
business, the purchase of coverage under a specialized policy,
such as a Garage Liability Policy, might seem obvious. Because
the FAP provides such broad coverage for both owned and
nonowned vehicles, this exclusion becomes necessary to make
the point that the procurement of alternative coverage is neces-
sary.
In any case, the exclusion would apply only to individuals
associated with the automobile business, since the FAP may
only be written for individuals and not for partnerships or cor-
porations. Thus, if an individual who works for an automobile
business uses his private family vehicle in that business, the
FAP covering the use of that personal vehicle would not cover
the business use of the same vehicle, with certain exceptions.
Those exceptions include: (1) the insured named in the policy;
(2) a resident of the same household as the named insured; (3)
215. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
216. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 177.
217. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Definitions."
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a partnership in which the named insured or such resident is a
partner; or, (4) any partner, agent or employee of the named
insured, such resident or partnership.21 8 The irony of this ex-
clusion is that by the time one accounts for all the possible
situations giving rise to a claim covered by the exceptions, the
exclusion itself seems empty.
As already demonstrated, the coverage of the insured's use of
a nonowned automobile seems the most comprehensive as far
as use is concerned, largely due to the low level of risk to the
insurer. But the use of nonowned vehicles is frequent in an
automobile business. Pick-up and delivery of customer vehicles,
road-testing and other uses raise the level of liability for the
insurer. For this reason, the use of nonowned vehicles in an
automobile business is specifically excluded under the FAP. 9
This exclusion is not intended to eliminate from an
individual's FAP coverage the use of a vehicle borrowed from a
car-dealer or repair garage while the insured's own vehicle is
under repair. The difference is that the individual who is using
the vehicle, which admittedly is part of an automobile business,
is not the owner of the automobile business. Therefore, in the
event of an accident, the individual or customer would be cov-
ered under his own FAP as if he were using a borrowed
car
.2
0
Nothing in the exclusion prevents an insured individual from
using a nonowned vehicle in any other sort of business, as long
as the vehicle is not furnished for regular use.
218. Id.
219. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
220. BRAINARD, supra note 2, at 180. See generally Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Strohkorb, 205 Va. 472, 137 S.E.2d 913 (1964) (automobile driven by a garage
employee between the dealer's repair garage and sales lot was being used in the
automobile business at the time it was involved in a collision and thus a garage
liability policy covered the automobile); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federal Mut. Ins.
Co., 204 Va. 879, 134 S.E.2d 253 (1964) (holding that an automobile salesman test-
driving the customer's trade-in vehicle was using it in the automobile business, and
the garage liability policy covered the vehicle when it was involved in an accident).
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g. Nuclear Materials
Exclusion (c) under Part I of the SCC-approved FAP states
that coverage does not apply:
[T]o bodily injury or property damage with respect to which
an insured under this policy is also an insured under a
contract of nuclear energy liability insurance issued by the
Nuclear Energy Liability Association or the Mutual Atomic
Energy Liability Underwriters and in effect at the time of
the occurrence resulting in such bodily injury or property
damage; provided, such contract of nuclear energy liability
insurance shall be deemed to be in effect at the time of
such occurrence notwithstanding such contract has termi-
nated upon the exhaustion of its limit of liability. 1
h. Medical Payments/Expenses and Income Loss Coverages
Under the medical payments coverage (Part II of the SCC
forms) there are full coverage exclusions when the injury is
sustained under the following conditions:
1. While occupying an owned vehicle while used as a public
or livery conveyance; or
2. While occupying any vehicle while located for use as a
residence or premises; or
3. When a person (whether occupying the vehicle or not) is
struck by a farm-type tractor or other equipment not on a pub-
lic road; or
4. While person occupying the vehicle was employed in the
automobile business, and the person was covered by workers'
compensation law; or,
5. In the event of war.'
In addition, any person other than the named insured or a
relative will be excluded under the following conditions:
221. SCC Forms, supra note 4, at Part I, "Exclusions."
222. Id. at Part 11, "Expense for Medical Services."
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1. While occupying a nonowned automobile used as a public
or livery conveyance; or
2. While the person is maintaining or using a nonowned
automobile while engaged in the automobile business; or
3. While the person is maintaining or using a nonowned
automobile and is engaged in any other business or occupa-
tion."
Since the statutory requirements for medical expense and
income loss coverage are few, rather extensive exclusions from
medical coverage can be written into the policy.
IV. OTHER COVERAGES 2
When an owner who is driving his own insured automobile
runs into a ditch-that is, he has a one-car accident-he has no
rights under his liability coverage. If he has medical and dis-
ability coverage, he can recover such benefits from his insurer,
whether he was at fault or not.' This coverage is similar to
that provided by most health-and-accident policies." Simi-
larly, if the insured has collision coverage, he can recover for
damages to his automobile, less any deductible, whether or not
he was at fault.
When this same owner-driver is involved in a collision with
another insured vehicle, his rights under his policy are the
same as when he went into the ditch in a one-car accident. But
now there is also the question of fault. If the other driver was
at fault, then the owner-driver has rights against the other
driver and his or her liability insurer. The owner-driver will not
be able to recover and retain payment for damages to his auto-
mobile from both his own insurer under the collision coverage
and from the other driver's liability insurer, however.
Medical expense and income loss coverage is similar to, but
223. Id.
224. RITZ, supra note 7, at 14-15, provides the language for the introduction to
this section.
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
226. See generally id. §§ 38.2-3500 to -3515 (describing individual accident and
sickness insurance policies) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
912 [Vol. 28:863
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
not the same as, the medical payments coverage.2 7 In addi-
tion to the minimum insurance required by Virginia law,
insureds can specifically request additional no-fault insurance
coverage for medical and disability.' Such coverage applies to
the named insured and his relatives who are members of his
household while (1) in or upon, entering or alighting from a
motor vehicle,' or (2) when struck by a motor vehicle when
not occupying a motor vehicle." ° Additionally, occupants of
the insured vehicle itself are covered. 1
At a minimum, the insurer must offer $2000 coverage, per
person, for all reasonable and necessary health care" and fu-
neral expenses resulting from, and within three years"3 of,
the accident.' Additionally, where the injured person is nor-
mally employed, up to $100 per week loss of income benefits
are provided for up to one year following the accident."5 The
insured has the option of purchasing either the medical or loss
of income coverage, or both. 6 Where an insured has pur-
chased such coverage for multiple vehicles, aggregation of the
coverages is generally possible where covered expenses exceed
the limits for a single insured vehicle. 7
227. RIrz, supra note 7, at 14-15.
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201 (Repl. Vol. 1994). VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2202 sets
out the required language to notify an insured of the availability of this coverage;
however, a specific request for the optional coverage is required. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seay, 236 Va. 275, 278, 373 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1988).
229. The 1991 amendment substituted "while in or upon, entering or alighting
from" for "while occupying a motor vehicle." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201 cmt. (Repl.
Vol. 1994).
230. Id. § 38.2-2201(AXii). "Struck by a motor vehicle" includes motorcycles. See
USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yaconiello, 226 Va. 423, 426, 309 S.E.2d 324, 325 (1983).
231. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201(AXi) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
232. Health care includes medical, chiropractic, hospital, dental, surgical, ambu-
lance, prosthetic and rehabilitation services. Id. § 38.2-2201(A)(1).
233. Before the 1991 amendment, the limit was two years. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
2201 cmt. (Cur. Supp. 1994).
234. Id.
235. Id. § 38.2-2201(AX2).
236. Id. § 38.2-2201(B).
237. Id. § 38.2-2201(C) (providing specific limitations).
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V. INCIDENTS OF TRIAL AND SETTLEMENT
A. Insurer's Duty to Defend
Under the liability coverage, the insurer not only is under a
duty to pay damages, but "the company shall defend any suit"
in which an injured claimant or plaintiff is seeking damages
which are payable under the terms of the policy.' Such de-
fense is provided at the insurer's expense and the insurer ordi-
narily has the right to retain counsel of its own choosing."
The duty to defend may be broader than the duty to pay a
judgment against the insured. In 1981, the Virginia Supreme
Court restated the law on the insurer's duty to defend:
When an initial pleading "alleges facts and circumstances,
some of which would, if proved, fall within the risk covered
by the policy," the insurance company is obligated to defend
its insured .... Moreover, where the allegations "leave it in
doubt whether the case alleged is covered by the policy,"
the insurer's failure to defend is at its own risk .... Only
when "it appears clearly [that the insurer] would not be
liable under its contract for any judgment based upon the
allegations," does the company no duty to defend."0
Thus, the suit is within the coverage of the policy, and the
insurer is obligated to defend, even though the suit may be
groundless, false, or fraudulent."' Only where the allegations
in the pleadings make clear that the insurer would not be lia-
ble to pay any judgment under the policy based on those allega-
tions, does the insurer have no duty to defend. 2
238. Authorities are split on whether the duty to defend encompasses a duty to
appeal. See generally C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer to Appeal, 69
A.L.R.2d 690 (1960).
239. Generally, the insurer has exclusive control over the defense. Aetna v. Price,
206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220, 227 (1966); see generally 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance §
1393 (1982).
240. Parker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 222 Va. 33, 35, 278 S.E.2d 803, 804 (1981)
(citing Lerner v. Safeco, 219 Va. 101, 104, 245 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1978); London Guar.
Co. v. White & Bros., 188 Va. 195, 199-200, 49 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1948)); see also
Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 240 Va. 185, 397 S.E.2d 100 (1990); Reisen v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 302 S.E.2d 529 (1983); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Obenshain, 219 Va. 44, 245 S.E.2d 247 (1978).
241. London Guar. Co., 188 Va. at 198, 49 S.E.2d at 255.
242. Norman v. INA, 218 Va. 718, 725, 239 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1978); London Guar.
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When disagreement arises between the insurer and the in-
sured as to whether the policy provides coverage, the insurer
has several choices. It may do nothing, effectively refusing to
defend the suit; however, when the insurer refuses to defend, it
does so at its own risk. If it is correct in denying coverage, it is
of course free of any liability to the insured or the injured
claimant. But if the insurer is wrong, and it turns out that the
policy did cover the suit, then the insurer will not only be lia-
ble for the insured's defense and adjudged liability, but also for
breach of its covenant to defend.'
On the other hand, the insurer may enter into a reservation
of rights agreement with the insured, under which it defends
the suit, but reserves the right to contest the coverage of its
policy when (1) the injured plaintiff seeks to enforce the judg-
ment against the insurer, or (2) in an independent action by
the insured for breach of the insurance contract. If the insurer
defends without a reservation of rights, the insurer has waived
any claim it may have that its policy does not provide coverage
for the judgment.
Another option of the insurer, as exercised in Utica Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,' is to seek a de-
claratory judgment to determine whether it has a duty to
defend. 5
Co., 188 Va. at 198, 49 S.E.2d 254. Even where the pleadings make it clear that
some claims are covered and some are not, the insurer's duty to defend arises and
extends to all allegations. See, e.g., Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. International Spas of
Ariz., Inc., 634 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Refusal of
Liability Insurer to Defend Action Against Insured Involving Both Claims Within Cov-
erage of Policy and Claims Not Covered, 41 A.L.R.2d 434 (1955).
243. United States Fire Ins. v. Aspen Bldg. Corp., 235 Va. 263, 267, 367 S.E.2d
478, 480 (1988); Parker v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 222 Va. 33, 35, 278 S.E.2d 803, 804
(1981); London Guar. Co., 188 Va. at 198, 49 S.E.2d at 254. The insurer who wrong-
fully refuses to defend may also be liable for the attorney's fees incurred by the in-
sured to defend himself. See Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d
60, 63 (4th Cir. 1952); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 212 Va. 234, 236, 183
S.E.2d 138, 139 (1971); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-209, 8.01-661 (Repl. Vol.
1994 & Repl. VoL 1992) (dealing with coverage denials not in good faith).
244. 223 Va. 145, 286 S.E.2d 225 (1982).
245. Id. at 146, 286 S.E.2d at 226; see also Criterion Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas.
Co., 210 Va. 446, 449, 171 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1970).
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B. Settlement
The insurer ordinarily has the right to negotiate settle-
ment." If the insurer controls the defense and may make
settlements as it deems expedient, a "relationship of confidence
and trust is created between the insurer and the insured which
imposes upon the insurer the duty to deal fairly with the in-
sured in handling any disposition of any claim covered by the
policy." 7 Note however, that the insurer and the insured are
not in a fiduciary relationship; the insurer has a right to pro-
tect its own economic interests.' Nonetheless, the insurer
cannot act in bad faith in considering settlement of a claim. 9
The test of bad faith involves a determination of whether the
insurer acted in furtherance of its own interests in failing to
take advantage of an opportunity to settle within policy limits
with intentional disregard of the financial interest of the
insuredY0
When the claim is for an amount exceeding the policy limits,
any settlement must take the insured's overall interest into
account. Should the insurer refuse to settle a claim within the
policy limits, the insurer may be liable for a judgment in excess
of policy limits where that failure to settle resulted from the
insurer's bad faith, rather than negligence." In distinguishing
the "bad faith rule" from the "negligence rule," to determine the
insurer's liability in these cases, the Virginia Supreme Court
has provided the following guidelines:
[Tihe obligation assumed by the insurer with respect to
settlement is to exercise good faith in dealing with offers of
compromise, having both its own and the insured's interests
in mind. And it may be said also that a reasonably diligent
effort must be made to ascertain the facts upon which a
good faith judgment as to the settlement can be formulat-
246. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 235 Va. 136, 142, 366 S.E.2d
93, 97 (1988).
247. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 760-61, 146 S.E.2d 220, 227-
28 (1966).
248. Floyd, 235 Va. at 143, 366 S.E.2d at 97.
249. Id.; Price, 206 Va. at 761-62, 146 S.E.2d at 228.
250. Floyd, 235 Va. at 143-44, 366 S.E.2d at 97.
251. Price, 206 Va. at 764-65, 146 S.E.2d at 230.
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ed .... A decision not to settle must be an honest one. It
must result from a weighing of probabilities in a fair man-
ner. To be a good faith decision, it must be an honest and
intelligent one in the light of the company's expertise in the
field. Where reasonable and probable cause appears for
rejecting a settlement offer and for defending the damage
action, the good faith of the insurer will be vindicated. 2
VI. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES
The purpose of the uninsured and underinsured motorist
clauses required by statute in Virginia is to provide coverage to
those innocent people injured by negligent drivers with no in-
surance coverage or with inadequate insurance coverage.'
The uninsured or underinsured motorists themselves are not
the designated beneficiaries of the coverage; in fact, negligent
drivers themselves cannot make claims against uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage of the injured third parties.'
A. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
The Virginia Uninsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Stat-
ute' requires automobile insurance policies to contain "an
endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all
sums that he is legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." 6 The re-
quired minimum coverages are the same as those required for
general liability under a motor vehicle policy."
Two classes of insureds can recover from uninsured motorist
coverage. The first class includes the "named insured and, while
resident of the same household, the spouse of the named in-
252. Id. at 761-62, 146 S.E.2d at 228 (quoting Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln
Mut. Ins. Co., 157 A.2d 319, 322 (N.J. 1960)).
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
254. Bayer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 221 Va. 5, 267 S.E.2d 91 (1980).
255. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
256. Id. § 38.2-2206(A).
257. Id. Such limits are currently $25,000 for bodily injury/death per person,
$50,000 for bodily injury/death per accident, and $20,000 for property damage. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-472.3 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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sured, and relatives of either . .. ."' The second class of in-
sured includes "any person who uses the motor vehicle to which
the policy applies." 9
Members of the first class receive a broader scope of cover-
age-they are covered "while in a motor vehicle or other-
wise."' Thus, coverage exists where a first class insured is
injured by an uninsured motorist and the insured is: (1) in the
insured vehicle; (2) in any other vehicle; or, (3) a pedestrian.
The second class of insured do not receive the same extent of
coverage under the statute. Permissive users of the insured
vehicle are protected only when actually "using"26' the auto-
mobile. Guests of either first class members or permissive us-
ers, while "in" the insured vehicle, are afforded uninsured mo-
torist coverage as well." 2
B. Underinsured Motorist Coverage
The Virginia Underinsured Motorist Coverage statute, amend-
ed in 1993, provides that:
The endorsement or provisions shall obligate the insurer to
make payment for bodily injury or property damage caused
by the operation or use of an underinsured motor vehicle to
the extent the vehicle is underinsured, as defined in subsec-
tion B of this section.
[subsection B] A motor vehicle is "underinsured" when, and
to the extent that, the total amount of bodily injury and
property damage coverage applicable to the operation or use
of the motor vehicle and available for payment for such
bodily injury or property damage.., is less than the total
amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any person
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. "Using" the vehicle does not require actual driving of the vehicle at the time
of the accident. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476
(1990).
262. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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injured as a result of the operation or use of the
vehicle.'
The same group of insureds protected under uninsured mo-
torist coverage insurance provisions are protected under under-
insured motorist provisions." Likewise, the same analysis is
used to determine the extent of coverage.2"
C. Application of the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist
Insurance Provisions
Virginia's uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance
provisions are liberally construed in favor of the insured.2"
Where not actually included in a policy, the provisions of the
statute are implicitly incorporated into the automobile insur-
ance contract."7 Where the statute and a policy conflict, the
statute controls if the policy restricts coverage,2" and the poli-
cy controls when the policy expands coverage. 9
D. Stacking Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverages
"The term 'stacking' is used to describe a situation where all
available policies are added together to create a larger pool
from which the injured party may draw in order to compensate
him for his actual loss where a single policy is not sufficient to
make him whole."27 Stacking has also been referred to as
"the doctrine of multiple recovery" or "pyramiding coverage." 71
263. Id. §§ 38.2-2206(A)-(B).
264. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
266. Tudor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Va. 918, 224 S.E.2d 156 (1976); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
267. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 203 Va. 440, 125 S.E.2d 154
(1962).
268. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
269. Roberts v. GEICO and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 135
(W.D. Va. 1988); Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Rainey, 237 Va. 270, 377 S.E.2d 393
(1989); Hill v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 237 Va. 148, 375 S.E.2d 727 (1989); Penn-
sylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bristow, 207 Va. 381, 150 S.E.2d 125 (1966).
270. COUCH ON INSURANCE § 45:628 (2d ed. 1981).
271. Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 213 Va. 72, 77, 189 S.E.2d 832, 836
(1972).
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Although no Virginia statute clearly mandates stacking, Vir-
ginia courts have repeatedly embraced the practice in various
situations. The courts' underlying rationale has often been
based upon the purpose of the uninsured and underinsured
motorist insurance law in Virginia-to fully compensate insured
victims of uninsured and underinsured motorists.7 2 Although
the insured cannot recover more than his actual loss or
judgment,7 3 such compensation may be held to include puni-
tive damages." 4
Virginia's application of stacking in cases of multiple unin-
sured or underinsured motorist coverages varies, depending
upon language in the insurance policy, the number of policies
involved, and the class of the insured. The following section
contains a summary of the general rules concerning stacking of
such insurance policies in Virginia.
E. Summary of Virginia General Rules of Stacking and
Priority of Payments"'
1. Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverages
Intra-policy stacking of uninsured motorist coverages (multi-
ple coverages within one policy) is generally not allowed due to
standard clear and unambiguous language precluding such
stacking in most policies. Where such language is not contained
in the policy, the insured has paid separate premiums on each
vehicle, and the victim attempting to stack coverages is a first
class insured, stacking will generally be allowed.7
272. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 363 S.E.2d 703 (1988);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 203 Va. 600, 125 S.E.2d 840
(1962).
273. White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965), affd, 361
F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140
S.E.2d 817 (1965); COUCH, supra note 259, at 73 (footnote omitted).
274. Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 213 Va. 81, 84-85, 189 S.E.2d 320,
323-24 (1972).
275. For a detailed discussion of these rules, see John G. Douglass & Francis E.
Telegadas, Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverages, 24 U.
RICH. L. REV. 87 (1989).
276. See Goodville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625
(1981); cf. Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320
(1972); Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972)
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2. Intra-Policy Stacking of Underinsured Motorist Coverages
Intra-policy stacking of underinsured motorist coverages is
generally not allowed due to standard clear and unambiguous
language precluding such stacking in most policies. Where such
language is not contained in the policy, the insured has paid
separate premiums on each vehicle, and the victim attempting
to stack coverages is a first class insured, stacking will general-
ly be allowed. 7
3. Inter-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverages
Inter-policy stacking of uninsured motorist coverages is gen-
erally allowed, despite clear and unambiguous policy language
attempting to preclude such stacking.2
78
4. Inter-Policy Stacking of Underinsured Motorist Coverages
Inter-policy stacking of underinsured motorist coverages is
generally allowed, despite clear and unambiguous policy lan-
guage attempting to preclude such stacking.279
5. Priority of Uninsured Motorist Coverage Payments
The primary coverage is provided by the host vehicle's
insurance, and excess coverage is pro-rated among remaining
insurers." °
(both permitting intra-policy stacking in the absence of clear and unambiguous policy
language preventing such stacking).
277. See Goodville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625
(1981).
278. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994) (provisions for priority of
payment among underinsured carriers clearly contemplates that inter-policy stacking
is permissible); see also Virginia Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 242
Va. 203, 408 S.E.2d 898 (1991); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Sylva, 242 Va. 191, 409 S.E.2d
127 (1991).
280. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 211 Va. 133, 176
S.E.2d 327 (1970).
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6. Priority of Underinsured Motorist Coverage Payments
The priority of payments among underinsured insurers is
specifically provided for by Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B).
This section basically provides for the following priority: (1)
host vehicle insurance; (2) coverage where victim's name in-
sured; and (3) coverage where victim is a first class insured. 1
VII. CONCLUSION
The Continuing Legal Education curriculum planners for
1994 recognized the importance of automobile insurance in the
legal practices of large numbers of Virginia attorneys by autho-
rizing credit for no less than three separate seminars last
spring alone. Wilfred J. Ritz served an important need in 1983
when he summarized both law and practice in the Common-
wealth into a convenient deskbook. Today, the statutes govern-
ing this area have been modernized and reorganized. Yet, new
and different legal issues emerge through the Commonwealth's
court system on an almost daily basis forcing the practitioner to
always be a few steps behind developments.
281. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1994); see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Sylva, 242 Va. 191, 409 S.E.2d 127 (1991).
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